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One of the defining features of federalism is that national policy changes require some form of
bargaining among representatives of states or provinces. In fact, the basic structure of many
federations can be traced to a bargain, or a set of bargains, between previously autonomous
entities. These entities are often quite asymmetric in size and income, and the original
federal bargain often endowed some units with much greater legislative representation than
others, generally in an upper chamber based on territorial rather than population-based
representation.
Decades or even hundreds of years later, these highly asymmetric representation struc-
tures survive in federations. A relatively large empirical literature asks a rather natural
question: Do these institutions matter? In particular, do over-represented regions receive
larger per-capita shares of central government expenditures?
Single-country studies, mostly focusing on the United States, have uncovered a positive
correlation between representation and expenditures, but there are good reasons to be con-
cerned about the causal mechanism since within any country, given the nature of the initial
constitutional bargain, legislative representation is likely correlated with some other factors–
for example a small and sparse population and an agricultural economy– that affect central
government expenditures through mechanisms having nothing to do with representation.
More recently, a handful of case studies have employed stronger identification strategies and
found evidence in favor of an exogenous impact of representation on budgetary outcomes,
but given their narrow scope and focus on individual countries, it is difficult to draw general
conclusions from these studies about the importance of representation.
Moreover, while it seems intuitive that regions with more votes might walk away from
the legislature with more money, the theoretical motivation for existing empirical studies is
surprisingly weak. Most studies cite the seminal contribution of Baron and Ferejohn (1989),
although this model is ambiguous about the impact of representation on budgetary outcomes.
This paper makes two primary contributions. First, it presents a simple legislative bar-
gaining model in which representatives of regions must form winning legislative coalitions
in order to enact redistributive tax-transfer schemes. In this model, provinces proposing
changes from the status quo must offer both a uniform national tax rate on income and
an inter-regional distribution of lump-sum grants. The analysis shows that an increase in
representation for a region leads to a higher payoff regardless of whether it is rich or poor.
An increase in representation has two effects: it increases a region’s proposal power, and
it makes a region a more attractive coalitional partner for other proposers. Both of these
effects work unambiguously in the same direction.
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Second, we demonstrate that the relationship between legislative representation and
grants holds up in a surprisingly large number of federations, and the magnitude of the
effect is generally quite large. The key advantage of our cross-country empirical approach
is that we are able to examine countries with a wide range of institutional settings, and
crucially, a wide range of experiences in reaching the initial constitutional bargain that gen-
erated the representation scheme. Unlike existing single-country studies, we are able to show
that the relationship holds up whether the over-represented states are large or small, densely
or sparsely populated, rich or poor, and whether or not they were powerful at the time of
the initial constitutional bargain.
Regional income plays a central role in our theoretical model, and a danger in single-
country studies is that the legacy of the initial constitutional bargain leaves a high correlation
between income and representation, making it difficult to disentangle the relationship be-
tween representation and redistribution. Thus it is particularly useful that our federations
include some cases in which rich states are over-represented, some cases in which poor states
are over-represented, and some in which there is no relationship between income and repre-
sentation. We show that the connection between representation and grants is strong in each
of these settings.
Additionally, the theoretical model can be extended to allow for some more contingent
insights into the conditions under which intergovernmental grants might be progressive,
regressive, or income-neutral in the long run. In the model, if all provinces have equal
representation, agenda-setters will favor poor provinces since their support can be obtained
at lower cost, generating long-term progressivity in the transfer system. However, once again,
the role of territorial representation looms large since this effect can easily be unraveled or
even reversed if relatively wealthy provinces are sufficiently over-represented. Alternatively,
it can be amplified if poor provinces are over-represented. These insights are quite consistent
with patterns in the cross-country data.
In the next section, we begin by situating our analysis in the literatures on federalism and
distributive politics, and introducing basic facts about the joint distribution of population
and income across provinces in nine federations along with the institutions through which
provinces are represented. The third section develops the legislative bargaining model and
establishes the central argument about malapportionment. The next three sections present
the results of empirical investigations, and the final section concludes.
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2 Federalism, Representation, and Distributive Poli-
tics
2.1 Territorial Representation in Comparative Perspective
While countries that refer to themselves as federations have some similarities, there is no
uniform path leading to modern institutions of territorial representation. In some federa-
tions, modern representative institutions can be traced directly to a crucial moment when
a group of sovereign political units forms a voluntary union. In these settings, institutions
of representation that have survived to the present are likely to favor groups that faced the
greatest risks of confederation when the initial deal was struck.
In other federations, the notion of a voluntary union is less applicable. For instance, when
the post-Franco Spanish constitution was negotiated, the governments of the autonomous
communities had not yet been constituted, and representatives of Catalonia were not in a po-
sition to threaten to undermine a relatively centralized constitution, in large part because of
the unattractive default payoff of a return to authoritarianism (Colomer 1998). In Germany,
while Land governments existed prior to the negotiation of the Basic Law in the aftermath of
World War II and the wealthier Laender were unhappy with the centralization of tax power,
individual Laender ultimately did not have a veto over the constitution (Renzsch 1991).
A concern for empirical studies of malapportionment is that the states favored in the
initial constitutional bargain may have some qualities that also favor them in the game of
distributive politics years later. Perhaps the most basic concern is that through a common
logic, such states tend to be sparsely populated and located in the economic periphery.
The classical view of federalism is as a pact among previously sovereign entities, each
of whom perceives some advantages from pooling their sovereignty and creating a union
to achieve some important collective goods like mutual defense, a common currency, or
free trade. But an important problem in the formation of such unions is that the risks and
expected benefits are not equal across units. In particular, some units might fear exploitation
by other units in the future, and as a result, withhold their assent to the creation of the
union.
One of the most important issues facing proto-federations in the late 18th century and
throughout the 19th century pitted the interests of a burgeoning manufacturing sector, which
desired protection from imports in order to build up a domestic market, against those of the
primary product exporting periphery, which favored free trade. This was an important battle
in the events leading to the modern federal bargain in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
the German Zollverein, Mexico, and the United States. In the United States, of course,
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there was also a closely related battle over slavery. Generally speaking, the agricultural
periphery feared exploitation by the urban, industrializing core, which was made up of more
populous units (e.g. New York, Ontario, Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo) that were also rapidly
gaining population. A rather natural way to assuage the fears of the periphery was to draw
provincial boundaries and enact modes of provincial representation that would over-represent
the periphery, effectively giving them a veto over changes from the status quo.
In the years after the initial bargain was struck, in many federations the process of in-
dustrialization and urbanization only increased this asymmetry as migrants moved from
the agricultural periphery to the urban core but institutions of representation remained un-
changed. Additionally, the representative structure in some federations has been altered by
legacies of authoritarianism. Realizing the potential usefulness of small rural states as coali-
tion partners in the legislature, Peron in 1950s Argentina and the Brazilian military regime
of the 1960s utilized a similar strategy of creating new, politically friendly states (Gibson
2004; Diaz-Cayeros 2006; Bruhn, Gallego, and Onorato 2008). Thus in many federations,
the over-represented states tend to be sparsely populated today.
−Figure 1 about here−
For the decade from 1990 to 2000, for each province in each of the nine federations for
which we were able to collect data, Figure 1 plots the province’s average seats per capita,
expressed as a share of the national average, against the log of standardized population
density. The dark dots correspond to the lower chamber, and the light dots represent the
upper chamber. In many federations there is a tendency to over-represent sparsely populated
states, especially in the upper chamber. However, the relationship is neither linear nor
universal. In addition to the sparse Western states, the U.S. Senate also over-represents
urban Eastern states like Delaware and Rhode Island. The most over-represented states
in Germany are the urban, industrialized state of Saarland and the dense city-states of
Hamburg and Bremen. In Canada, the most over-represented provinces are the relatively
dense Maritimes.
Another potentially important correlate of both representation and grants might be in-
come. One possibility might be that wealthy states are inherently influential, and are able to
bargain for greater representation. Alternatively, one might guess that by over-representing
areas that constituted the agricultural periphery in the 18th or early 19th centuries, federa-
tions would tend to over-represent relatively poor provinces. Figure 2 plots the representation
variable against average real provincial GDP per capita (expressed as a share of the national
average) at the end of the 20th century. Some federations clearly over-represent the poor,
some over-represent the wealthy, and others display no pattern.
5
−Figure 2 about here−
In Australia, indeed the upper chamber was initially designed to protect the interests of
the relatively poor, natural resource-oriented states, especially Tasmania and Western Aus-
tralia, and there is still a negative correlation between income and per-capita representation,
but this is changing as the income of Western Australia and the Northern Territory have
experienced dramatic increases associated with natural resource booms. In Canada as well,
there is a significant negative relationship between income and representation owing to the
Maritimes. In post-unification Germany, the relationship is ambiguous: it would be nega-
tive if not for the substantial over-representation of the wealthy city-states. In Brazil and
Switzerland, a handful of small, very poor states in the periphery are rather dramatically
over-represented, but the overall relationship is not significant. In contrast, the Argentine
and Mexican federations tend to over-represent states with income above the national av-
erage. The same has been true of the United States until around 1990, after which the
relationship has lost significance.
Figures 1 and 2 also demonstrate cross country differences in the extent of malapportion-
ment, and differences between upper and lower chambers. In the Latin American federations
as well as the United States and Switzerland, several provinces have per-capita legislative
representation in the upper chamber that exceeds 200 percent of the national average. In
some federations, like the United States, Germany, Switzerland, and Australia, asymmetric
territorial representation is substantial in the upper chamber, while the lower chamber comes
somewhat closer to equal apportionment by population. In Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico,
however, the asymmetry is dramatic in both chambers.
In Canada and Spain, the constitutional bargain did not include a strong territorial
upper chamber, but the lower chamber is characterized by non-trivial malapportionment.
However, the literature on both countries describes a form of ”executive federalism,” where
intergovernmental fiscal flows are reportedly subject to bargaining between the national and
provincial executives. And in Canada, perhaps in part to compensate for the lack of a
territorial upper chamber, there is a strong norm of including representatives of all provinces
in the cabinet.
2.2 Empirical Studies of Malapportionment and Public Expendi-
tures
Given these large asymmetries in representation, an obvious hypothesis is that as national
governments built political coalitions in order to develop the power to tax during the first half
of the 20th century and dramatically increased government spending throughout the second
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half (Tanzi and Schuknecht 2000), the states that bargained for above-average legislative
representation in an earlier era of tariffs and excise taxes would be able to extract above-
average shares of government expenditures in the era of direct central government taxation
of income. For instance, the literature on the construction of the New Deal coalition in the
United States argues that small, sparsely populated states were crucial targets of vote-buying
efforts by political entrepreneurs attempting to introduce progressive reforms (Wright 1974,
Anderson and Tollison 1991).
Since Wright’s (1974) initial study of the New Deal, a large empirical literature has
attempted to ascertain the relationship between over-representation and public expenditures
in a wide range of contexts. Atlas et al. (1995) and Hoover and Pecorino (2005) establish
a positive relationship between changes in states’ net receipts from federal expenditures
and changes in representation per capita in the U.S. Senate. However, Larcinese et al.
(2007) and Elis et al. (2009) point out that it is very difficult to disentangle the effect of
population movements from the effect of representation changes in this type of observational
study. Above all, population outflow from the economic periphery and increases in federal
funds might both be driven by some type of economic distress that has little to do with
representation or legislative bargaining.
A more natural approach is to focus on the relationship between levels of representation
and expenditures across states. In studies of the U.S. Senate, this approach is taken by Lee
(1998, 2000) and Larcinese et al. (2007). This has also been the approach in studies of
Germany (Pitlik et al. 2005) and the European Union (Rodden 2002), and a comparative
study of the federations in the Americas (Gibson, Calvo, and Falleti 2004). One of the
difficulties of causal identification with this approach, however, is that the size and population
density of provinces might be correlated with their expenditure needs, and the correlation
between representation and expenditures might be spurious. Specifically, provinces with
very small or sparse populations may experience higher per capita costs of service provision
(Alesina and Spolaore 2005). A related possibility is that voters in sparse and economically
undiversified provinces in the periphery place greater value on federal expenditure projects
than do voters in large, economically diverse provinces of the economic core, providing
incentives for their representatives to expend a larger share of their efforts on distributive
politics relative to other legislative endeavors. However, a European literature building on
the insights of Popitz (1932) emphasizes the opposite empirical relationship. Since cities
have cost advantages in the provision of many public goods, e.g. museums and zoos, urban
jurisdictions should optimally receive larger grants per capita than rural areas, and there
is evidence that at least in some European countries they do (Buettner and Holm-Hadulla
2008).
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Another set of more recent papers attempts to resolve these identification problems with
a number of creative techniques. First, Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2002) examine
changes in apportionment within U.S. states associated with the Supreme Court’s Baker v.
Carr decision in 1962, which led to a significant flow of funds away from the previously over-
represented counties. Horiuchi and Saito(2003) report an equalization in per capita transfers
associated with a shift to more equal apportionment in the wake of the 1994 reapportion-
ment in Japan. Hirano (2006) and Hirano and Ting (2008) use the deaths of legislators
in the Japanese diet to demonstrate the impact of exogenous under-representation on the
distribution of resources. Making use of the relatively equal representation of U.S. states
in the House relative to the Senate, Knight (2008) and Hauk and Wacziarg (2007) contrast
earmarks that originate in the Senate versus the House and find a greater tendency to target
small states in the Senate. Elis et al (2009) make use of discontinuities in the apportionment
formula for the U.S. House to demonstrate that when a state receives an extra representative
as the result of reapportionment, it receives additional transfers. Finally, Aksoy and Rod-
den (2009) show that the bias in favor of small, over-represented EU member states in the
distribution of agricultural and structural transfers only shows up for new member states
once they have had a chance to fully participate in the negotiation of a multi-year budget.
On the whole, these studies bolster the claim that the cross-province correlations between
representation and expenditures from earlier single-country studies were driven at least in
part by some aspect of legislative representation. The disadvantage of these studies is that
they tend to focus on small segments of the overall inter-provincial transfer system (e.g.
earmarks), or relatively rare events like reapportionment or death, which make it difficult to
assess the overall importance of asymmetric representation for the distribution of resources in
federations. Moreover, each of these studies except for Gibson et al (2004) focus exclusively
on a single country.
The goal of this paper is to return attention to the bigger picture by analyzing comparable
data covering a relatively long period of time over several federations, allowing us to assess
the impact of representation on redistribution in a wide variety of contexts. While our
analysis suffers from the same limitation faced by all observational research, our explicitly
comparative analysis provides a number of advantages. Above all, Figures 1 and 2 show
that our cases demonstrate substantial variation on some of the key confounding variables
that cannot be achieved in the context of a single-case study. Some of our federations are
characterized by rural over-representation, while others over-represent city-states. Some
over-represent the poor, while others over-represent the rich. Our sample of federations
demonstrates considerable variation in the extent of malapportionment, as well as whether it
exists in one legislative chamber or two. As discussed further below, our sample of federations
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also demonstrates considerable variation in the nature of executive-legislative relations.
2.3 Theories of Malapportionment and Redistribution
Scholars that examine the effect of malapportionment on redistribution usually look for a
positive relationship between per capita representation and expenditures, usually citing the
seminal Baron-Ferejohn bargaining model. However, it is not clear how more representation
translates into a better payoff. Does an increase in representation cause an increase in pro-
posal power, an increase in voting power, or both? What is the connection between more
proposal power, more voting power, and the payoff of the distributive bargain? These ques-
tions are important since in the Baron-Ferejohn framework, it is possible to have a negative
relationship between more representation and a player’s expected payoff. The rationale is
that although more representation increases a player’s proposal power, it could make a player
a less attractive coalitional partner in the instances in which that player is not the agenda
setter. Depending on the size of the effects, a player could be worse off by an increase in its
representation.
The theoretical foundations for the connection between more representation and a higher
share of government expenditures are weak because the literature does not clearly disentangle
the effect of more proposal power from the effect of more voting power and wether these
effects work in the same direction or not. An important exception is Ansolabehere, Snyder
and Ting’s (2003) analysis of legislative bargaining in a bicameral legislature. They use a
non-cooperative bargaining game based on the closed-rule, infinite-horizon model of Baron
and Ferejohn to analyze the conditions under which unequal representation in a bicameral
legislature may produce an unequal division of public expenditures. Ansolabehere, Snyder
and Ting separate the effect of unequal voting power from the effect of unequal proposal
power and show that when there is unequal voting power but equal proposal power, all
lower-chamber members have the same expected payoff.
Brian Knight (2008) analyses the relationship between legislative representation, bar-
gaining power and the geographic distribution of federal funds from both a theoretical and
empirical perspective. He develops a formal model in which the bargaining advantage op-
erates through two channels: a proposal power channel and a voting cost channel. In his
model, the relationship between more representation and more distribution of federal funds
for a jurisdiction is not unambiguous: the proposal power is not valuable under certain con-
ditions. We develop a model in which an increase in representation unambiguously produces
an increase in the expected bargaining payoff; in our model the proposal power is always
valuable.
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Furthermore, the theoretical work in the tradition of Baron-Ferejohn, including An-
solabehere, Snyder and Ting (2003) and Knight (2008) assume that the parties bargain
over how to divide an exogenous pie. However, if the pie is not exogenous, the same parties
that bargain over dividing the pie have to first decide on how much to contribute to the
pie that is to be redistributed. If the size of the pie is determined endogenously, another
important variable in the bargaining process is a player’s income.
In this paper, building from the approach suggested by Perssen and Tabellini (2002), we
develop a simple game-theoretic model with both taxation and redistribution in order to shed
light on the process through which constituent units in the world’s federations constructed
coalitions that generated different long-term patterns of inter-regional redistribution. In the
model, each player has an initial income. The bargain is both over a level of taxation and
redistribution of the pie created from the taxed income. The main purpose of the model
is to show that an increase in representation always leads to a higher payoff for a player
regardless of the player’s initial income. In the model, an increase in representation has two
beneficial effects: it increases a player’s proposal power and also makes the player a more
attractive coalition partner in the instances in which the the player is not the agenda setter.
In this model, more proposal power and more voting power work in the same direction with
the combined effect of increasing the bargain payoff.
3 The Model
3.1 An Example
Before explaining the model, we introduce the intuition with a very simple example. Suppose
that there are 5 states in the legislature. We label the state by s = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Their income
is Y1 = 2, Y2 = 3, Y3 = 4, Y4 = 5, Y5 = 6. The total number of votes in the legislature
is V = 15. The legislative bargaining proceeds as follows: One state is recognized as the
agenda setter and makes a policy proposal consisting of a flat tax rate on income and an
expenditure share for each state out of the total taxed income. The probability of being
recognized as the agenda setter is proportional with a state’s voting weight, for a state s the
probability of being the agenda setter is vs
V
.
The legislature works under simple majority rule and thus a policy proposal needs at
least 8 votes to be approved. If the proposal is not approved, the result is the status quo,
where each state retains its initial income. Let us compare two cases: 1) in the first scenario,
the voting weights are v1 = 2, v2 = 4, v3 = 5, v4 = 1, v5 = 3 and 2) in the second scenario,
the voting weights are v1 = 2, v2 = 3, v3 = 4, v4 = 1, v5 = 5. In the first case state 5 has
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three votes and in the second case state 5 has five votes. State 5 has more representation in
the second scenario, and we want to see how such an increase in representation affects state
5 payoff.
Let us consider the first situation, the voting weights are v1 = 2, v2 = 4, v3 = 5, v4 =
1, v5 = 3. With probability
1
5
state 5 is the agenda setter and in that instance state 5 makes
a coalition with state 3 and obtains an payoff of 16. If state 5 is not the agenda setter (an
event that happens with probability 4
5
) state 5 is not a partner in any coalition regardless
of the agenda setter and thus state 5 gets a payoff of 0. Thus, in the first situation, the
expected payoff of state 5 is 3.2.
Table 1: State’s 5 Payoff in Situation 1
Agenda Setter Pr(Agenda Setter) Winning Coalition State’s 5 Payoff
State 1 2
15













Now consider the second situation, the voting weights are v1 = 2, v2 = 3, v3 = 4, v4 =
1, v5 = 5. With probability
1
3
state 5 is the agenda setter and in that instance state 5 makes
a coalition with state 2 and obtains a payoff of 17. In this situation, state 5 can get a positive
payoff even in instance in which state 5 is not the agenda setter. If state 2 is the agenda
setter (an event that happens with probability 1
5
), state 2 need at least 5 votes to form a
winning coalition. The coalition can be formed either with state 5 or with states 1 and 3;
both coalitions give the same payoff to state 2: a payoff of 14. Let us assume that a state





· 6 = 0.6 when state 5 is not the agenda setter. If any other state but state 2 is
the agenda setter, state 5 is not part of any winning coalition. Thus, the expected payoff of
state 5 is 1
3
· 17 + 1
10
· 6 = 6.27.
Table 2: State’s 5 Payoff in Situation 2
Agenda Setter Pr(Agenda Setter) Winning Coalition State’s 5 Payoff
State 1 2
15
State 2 and State 3 0
State 2 1
5
State 1 and State 3 or State 5 3
State 3 4
15
State 1and 2 0
State 4 1
15





Compared with the first situation, state 5’s expected payoff increases by 3.07. And 2.47
of this increase comes from the increase in agenda setting power and 0.6 comes from being
a more attractive coalitional partner when other states set the agenda.
3.2 Players, Preferences and the Timing of the Game
Consider a legislature consisting of J distinct states. State i = 1, ..., j has size of (mass) N
where Σi∈JN = J · N is the size of the entire population. Individual income is different in
all states, y1, ..., yj and without loss of generality, we can rank the overall income from the
poorest to the richest state, Y1 = N ·y1, Y2 = N ·y2, .., YJ = N ·yj in which Y1 < Y2 < ... < Yj.
Each state i has a certain number of votes in the legislature vi. We can interpret this as
the number of legislators from the respective state in the legislature. The total number of
votes in the legislature is Σi∈Jvi = V . We assume that V is odd.
The legislative bargaining proceeds as follows. One state is recognized as the agenda
setter. The probability of being recognized as the agenda setter is a function of the number
of seats a state has, i.e. for a state i the probability of being the agenda setter is vi
V
.
The agenda setter makes a policy proposal consisting of a flat tax rate 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and a
redistribution share (out the total amount of taxed income) for each state in the legislature
(r1, r2, ..., rj). After the agenda setter makes the proposal, each states votes yes or no. The
proposal is adopted if it garners at least a simple majority of votes, i.e V+1
2
. If the agenda
setter’s proposal does not garner a simple majority of the votes, the status quo policy results:
each state i retains its initial income Yi.
Thus, the payoff of a state i from one realization of the game is as follows: if the agenda
setter’s policy proposal is adopted, it is Ui = (1− t) ·Yi + ri and if the agenda setter’s policy
proposal is not adopted, the payoff is Ui = Yi.
The policy proposal consist both of a flat tax rate t and a redistribution tuple r1, r2, ..., rj
in which ri represents the amounts of grants state i receives in the policy proposal put forth
by the agenda setter a. Thus, the model includes both taxation and redistribution.
3.3 Equilibrium and Comparative Statics
The equilibrium concept we use is subgame perfect equilibrium. We can solve the game by
backward induction. For any policy proposal the agenda setter makes, a state i will vote
for the agenda setter’s proposal if and only if state i gets at least as much as the status-
quo outcome. Thus state i decision is to vote yes if (1 − t) · Ys + rs ≥ Ys and vote no if
(1− t) · Ys + rs < Ys.
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Now, given the decision of a state i we can solve for the agenda setter’s policy proposal.
Let us denote the agenda setter state by a, a state in the winning coalition by w ∈ W and
a state in the losing coalition l ∈ L. We show the following results:
Lemma 1. For any agenda setter a and any tax proposal t, a state l ∈ L that is not in
the winning coalition receives a share of the pie (from the taxed income) of rl = 0.
Proof. Suppose that the agenda setter i gives a state l that is not in the winning coalition a
share of the pie after taxation rl =  > 0. But since the state l is not in the winning coalition,
the agenda setter does not need its vote to get the proposal approved. This implies that
the agenda setter’s share of the pie would be smaller with  if the agenda setter gives any
positive amount to a state in the losing coalition. Thus the agenda setter has a profitable
deviation to rl = 0.
Lemma 2 For any agenda setter a and any tax proposal t, any state w ∈ W in the
winning coalition (other than the agenda setter) receives a payoff of Uw = Yw.
Proof. Suppose that a state in the winning coalition obtains a payoff of Uw = Yw + . But
then the agenda setter has a profitable deviation to offer the state w exactly Yw after taxation
and redistribution since the state w still votes for the agenda setter’s policy proposal and the
agenda setter’s payoff increases by . By this reasoning, all states in the winning coalition
W receive exactly their initial income after the taxation and redistribution.
Lemma 3. The agenda setter i proposes a flat tax rate of t = 1.
Proof. Suppose that the agenda setter proposes a tax rate t < 1. This implies that states
that are not in the winning coalition will have a strictly positive utility after the agenda
setter’s proposal is adopted. But then the agenda setter has a profitable deviation to t = 1
since the agenda setter’s payoff increases while the proposal is still adopted.
Finally, we need to solve for which states are in the winning coalition W and which
states are in the losing coalition L. The agenda setter needs V+1
2
votes to pass its policy
proposal. Assuming that the agenda setter always votes for its proposal, the agenda setter
needs another V+1
2
− va votes. The agenda setter’s objective is to maximize its payoff under
the constraint of forming the cheapest possible winning coalition. Thus, the agenda setter’s
problem is:
minimize ΣiYi such that Σivi ≥ V + 1
2
− va in which i ∈ J − a (1)
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Since there is a finite number of states, there is a finite number of combinations of
coalitions the agenda setter can form and thus the above problem has a solution. A simple
algorithm to solve the above problem is this: We can rank all possible coalitions in the
order of their total income and then find the coalition with the lowest total income but with
enough votes to form a majority. In case there are two (or more) coalitions that are solution
to the above problem, we assume that the agenda setter randomizes over which coalition to
form so that each coalition has an equal probability to be selected. We have the following:
Proposition 1. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
On the equilibrium path, the agenda setter a proposes a tax rate of t = 1 and a redis-
tribution bundle such that for every state w ∈ W , rw = Yw and for every l ∈ L, rl = 0 in
which the group of states W is the solution to (2) and the group of states L = J −W − a.
We can state the comparative statics results of interest. We have the following:
Proposition 2. An increase in a state’s representation results in an increase in that state’s
expected payoff.
Proof. Suppose we take any state i and increase its representation from vi to vi +  (the
extra epsilon in representation can be obtained by having all other states losing the same
fraction of votes, but it does not matter what other state or states are losing the  share
of votes). An increase in representation for state i increases the probability of being the




. In the instance in which the state i is the agenda setter, it
retains its initial income Yi and also obtains all the income of the states that are not part
of the winning coalition. If the state is not the agenda setter, an increase in representation
does not hurt it in the cases in which the state was already in a winning coalition because
an increase in its votes might increase the total number of votes of that coalition without
changing its total income. Furthermore, more representation might make the state a more
attractive coalitional partner since the state’s income is the same but the state has now more
votes, and as a result state i could be now partner in some winning coalition that was not
possible before the increase in representation. Thus, overall an increase in representation
unambiguously leads to a higher payoff for a state.
4 Empirical Analysis of Malapportionment
We have collected comparable data on intergovernmental grants, population, land area, leg-
islative representation, and real gross provincial product from 24 Argentine provinces (1980-
2001), 8 Australian states and two territories (1970-2001), 27 Brazilian states (1986-2001),
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10 Canadian provinces (1968-1997), 10 German Laender prior to unification (1970-1990),
and 16 thereafter (1991-2003), 32 Mexican states (1993-2006), 17 Autonomous Communities
in Spain (1984-2001), 26 Swiss Cantons (1980-2008), and 50 U.S. states (1977-1997).
Our presumption is that basic patterns of inter-regional transfers can be understood as
outcomes of a process of repeated legislative bargaining among representatives of provinces.
As intimated above, this might take place primarily in either or both legislative chambers,
within a parliamentary executive, or between the chief executives of the center and the
provinces.
In practice, each country’s legislative institutions structure inter-provincial bargains in
different ways. For instance, legislative coalition-building among provincial representatives
is most readily on display, and perhaps our model is most intuitive, in countries like the
United States, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Switzerland, where the chief executive lacks
the threat of a no-confidence procedure with which to force legislative cohesion among co-
partisan legislators (Diermeier and Feddersen 1998).
The other cases are parliamentary democracies characterized by stronger and more cohe-
sive parties in the legislature. A concern is that bargains among regional representatives do
not characterize legislative coalition-building in settings where party leaders are effectively
agenda-setters, and they have strong tools with which to discipline self-seeking provincial rep-
resentatives. However, in both Australia and Germany, the chief executive cannot threaten
to dissolve the upper chamber, and while parties are certainly relevant, raw inter-regional
bargaining and coalition-building takes place, especially regarding the basic contours of the
transfer system.
In Canada and Spain, with their strong, relatively cohesive parties and powerless upper
chambers, our model may seem less compelling. However, it is plausible that inter-regional
coalition-building of the kind modeled above is relevant within the Parliament, or even within
the political parties themselves, or that informal norms require the construction of cross-
region majorities within the executive itself, or through so-called ”executive federalism.”
These details are worthy of more careful theoretical exploration, but they are largely beyond
the scope of this paper.
Our model is based on lump-sum payoffs to provinces with a single national tax rate, so
it is natural for us to focus our empirical analysis on intergovernmental grants. Our measure
of inter-governmental grants aggregates over all transfer programs. Since we are interested
in long-term developments including one-off investment projects and periodic negotiations
of formulaic programs like co-participation in Latin American federations or equalization
in Germany and the Commonwealth federations, we make no distinction between formulaic
and discretionary transfers.
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The dependent variable, Grants Share Per Capita measures the real per capita grants
of each province, expressed as a share of the national average. The data have a multilevel
structure. The individual observations are clustered by province, by country, and by year.
Also, provinces are clustered by country. Thus, we have a multilevel data with both nested
and non-nested levels.
The independent variable of theoretical interest is Seat Share/Capita, a variable that
measures the seats per capita for a given state in a given year relative to the average across
all states. Also, if the legislature is bicameral, we take the average of this variable in the
lower and the upper chambers.
We also use several control variables that might influence the redistribution of grants.
First, as mentioned, the observations are clustered by province, by country, and year. We
include fixed effects for years in all models. We also include fixed effect for countries in the
analyses in which we only model the provincial level. We will also present some analyses in
which we model both the provincial and the country level. Second, the control variables we
include are measured both at the provincial level (some are time invariant and some vary by
year) and at the country-level (all country-level variables are time invariant).
At the state-level of analysis we include the following variables: Population Share,
Income Share, Relative State Size, and Capital State. First, we include a variable,
Population Share, that measures a state’s population relative to the average population of
all states. The rationale for including this variable is that, as suggested above, government
programs might subsidize regions experiencing population outflows for reasons that have
nothing to do with representation, and small states might attract larger shares of grants for
reasons having little to do with representation.
Second, we include a variable, Income Share/Capita that measures the per capita
income of a state relative to the national average. The explicit goal of many transfer programs
is to allow for equal service provision across provinces in spite of varying tax base or to combat
poverty. In many countries, intergovernmental grants are an important component of the
social safety net, and we might expect them to flow disproportionately to poor provinces.
Moreover, in the formal model above, if apportionment across states is equal, relatively poor
states should receive larger shares of transfers because they are more attractive coalition
partners (more on this below).
Third, we include a variable, Relative State Size that measures the size of a state in
square km divided by the size of the country. As suggested above, one could argue that
geographically large constituent units, like Alaska or Montana, present diseconomies of scale
and therefore require more public resources than small units to obtain the same level of
services, or that their representatives face different incentives to expend legislative effort on
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distributive politics.
Fourth, we include an indicator variable, Capital State that takes the value 1 if the
state is the capital and the value 0 otherwise. The rationale for including this variable
is that one might argue that the capital is in need of more public expenditures to fund
infrastructure related to the central government’s activities, or that the capital has more
influence at the bargaining table (for whatever reasons) beyond whatever leverage it gets
from its representation in the legislature.
At the country level of analysis we include the following variables: Presidential Sys-
tem, Democracy Age and Number of States. First, we include an indicator variable,
Presidential System that takes the value 1 if the country is a presidential system and
the value 0 otherwise. The rationale for including this variable was described above: in
presidential systems the political parties are weaker and the presidents hold an important
position at the bargaining table that might influence the type of coalitions formed. In con-
trast, in a parliamentary system, parties are stronger and thus party leaders might determine
how grants are distributed rather than a decentralized bargaining procedure in which each
member tries to get as much as possible for the geographic area she represents.
Second, we include a variable, Democracy Age that takes the value of the year in which
a country has become a democracy. The rationale for including this variable is that one could
argue that countries that have had a shorter tradition as a democracy are more likely to be
malapportioned. For example, researchers have noted that in Latin American countries,
before the transition to democracy, elites have attempted to give more representation to
areas from which those elites garnered electoral support (Gibson 2004; Bruhn, Gallego, and
Onorato 2008).
Third, we include a country-level variable, Number of States that takes the value of
the number of subnational units in a given country.
Finally, we also include (in some models) a lagged dependent variable, Lag Grants
Share/Capita. The political methodology literature is ambiguous about the inclusion of a
lagged dependent variable. The rationales for inclusion are both methodological and theo-
retical. First, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimator assumes that there is
no autocorrelation in the residuals. However, in time series data this assumption is almost
always violated. If we detect autocorrelation in an OLS regression, the inclusion of a lagged
dependent variable often eliminates any residual serial correlation.
Second, a lagged dependent variable might capture important omitted factors. In the
context of grants redistribution, one can argue that there are important variables that might
be omitted but could be captured by the inclusion of a lagged variables. For example,
coalitions are sticky and it might be that once formed, a coalition will continue to exist
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regardless of changes in representation.
On the other hand, researchers have argued that including a lagged dependent variable
could lead to biased coefficient estimates. For example, Achen (2000) has shown that even if
a lagged dependent variable is theoretically appropriate, remaining residual autocorrelation
can lead to biased coefficient estimates. We take this criticism and we will report the analysis
with and without a lagged dependent variable.
To take into account the multilevel structure in the data, we estimate a multilevel re-
gression model. We present two different set of models: one analysis with country and year
indicators and varying intercepts1 for state groups and another analysis with year indicators
and varying intercepts for both country and state groups.
4.1 State Level Model
In this section, we present multilevel analysis in which we only model the state-level of
the analysis while including fixed effects for country and year. To estimate the multilevel
regression model we use the R package lmer. The individual level model is the following:
GrantsSharei ∼ N(α0 + αstates[i] +Xiβ + i, σ2i ) (2)
where i indexes individual observations, X is a matrix of individual-level covariates, β
is the vector of coefficients for the individual-level regression, and i is the error associated
with observation i.
The state-level model is the following:
αstates ∼ N(Ysγ, σ2state) (3)
where s indexes the states, Ys is a matrix of state-level covariates, γ is the vector of coef-
ficients for the state-level regression, and σstate is the standard deviation of the unexplained
state-level errors.
The control variables are: Lag Grants Share/Capita, Population Share, Income
Share, Relative State Size, and Capital State. The results of the multilevel estimation
are the following:
−Table 3 about here−
Table 3 contains four models. The model in column 2 estimates the grants share per capita
controlling for the data structure and including only the variable of theoretical interest: seat
1For a discussion about this terminology see Gelman and Hill (2007).
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share per capita. The model in column 3 includes the control variables and the model in
column 4 includes both controls and the lagged dependent variable. Finally, the model in
column 5 is the same as the model in column 4 but all variables are standardized.
The representation variable has the expected sign and is significant at conventional levels.
The model in column 2 shows that the effect of the seat share per capita variable holds
regardless of any other control variables. In fact there is little difference in the point estimate
(and the standard error) for the seat share variable in the model in column 2 and in column
3. The model in column 4 includes the lagged dependent variable, the seat share variable
is still significant although the coefficient is half the value of the coefficient in the model in
column 2. The model in column 5 is the same as the model in column 4 but the variables are
standardized. For the model in column 5, one standard deviation increase in the seats share
per capita variable produces a 0.35 standard deviation increase in the dependent variable.
Also, we can note that neither the population share nor the income share variables are
significant but the relative size of the state variable and wether a state is a capital state or
not have a positive effect on the grants share/capita and also are statistically significant.
4.2 Country Level Model
In this section, we present multilevel analysis in which we model both the state-level and
the country-level of the analysis while including fixed effects for year. The individual level
regression is the following:
GrantsSharei ∼ N(α0 + αstates[i] + αcountryj[i] +Xiβ + i, σ2i ) (4)
where i indexes individual observations, X is a matrix of individual-level covariates, β
is the vector of coefficients for the individual-level regression, and i is the error associated
with observation i.
The state-level model is the following:
αstates ∼ N(Ysγ, σ2state) (5)
where s indexes the states, Ys is a matrix of state-level covariates, γ is the vector of
coefficients for the state-level regression, σstate is the standard deviation of the unexplained
state-level errors.
The country-level model is:
αcountryj ∼ N(Vjκ, σ2country) (6)
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where j indexes countries, V is a matrix of country-level covariates, κ is the vector of
coefficients for the country-level regression, and σcountry is the standard deviation of the
unexplained country-level errors.
The control variables are: Lag Grants Share, Population Share, Income Share,
Relative State Size, Capital State, Presidential System, Democracy Age and Num-
ber of States. The results of the estimation are shown in table 2:
−Table 4 about here−
Table 4 contains five models. The model in column 2 is exactly the model in table
3 column 4. The model in column 3 estimates the multilevel model with both state and
country level variable but without a lagged dependent variable. The model in column 4
includes the lagged dependent variable and the model in column 5 is similar with the model
in column 4 except that all variables are standardized. The variable seats share per capita
has the expected sign and is significant at conventional levels. The model in column 4 shows
that the effect of seats share per capita variable is exactly the same as in the state-multilevel
model only. In fact there is little difference in the point estimate (and the standard error)
for the seats share per capita variable in the model in column 2 and in column 4. The model
in column 5 is the same as the model in column 4 but the variables are standardized. For
the model in column 5, one standard deviation increase in the seats share per capita variable
produces a 0.35 standard deviation increase in the dependent variable.
We can also notice that if we interact the presidential system dummy with the seat share
per capita variable the results do not change. The size of the seat share per capita variable
is smaller but the presidential system indicator and the interactions are not statistically
significant. This result suggests that it is not the case that malapportionment works in
a fundamentally different way in presidential and parliamentary systems. We have also
estimated the model with a vote of no confidence indicator (which take the value 1 in
all presidential systems plus Switzerland), with similar results. The vote of no confidence
variable and the interaction are not statistically significant and the seat share per capita is
still statistical significant. The coefficient for the vote of no confidence indicator is -0.05 (and
the standard error is 0.1), the coefficient for the interaction is 0.05 (and the standard error
is 0.08) and the coefficient for the seat share per capita variable is 0.29 (and the standard
error is 0.08).
4.3 Cross-Section Analysis
In order to get a better sense of whether the results above are driven primarily by vari-
ation across provinces or over time within provinces, in this section we present results of
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analysis that focuses exclusively on cross-section variation. We construct a data set with
209 observations by taking provincial averages over the time period in the sample for all
variables. We will presents two estimations. First we estimate a simple OLS regression with
country fixed effects, and second, we estimate a multilevel regression including country-level
variables. The results of the estimations are provided in Table 3.
−Table 5 about here−
Table 5 contains three models. The model in column 2 estimates the effect of represen-
tation in an OLS model with country fixed effects. We can see that the variable seat share
per capita is positive and strongly significant. The model in column 3 estimates a multilevel
regression with varying intercepts for country and with two additional country level variable:
democracy age and presidential system, while the model in column 4 adds another country-
level variable: the number of states in the federation. The coefficient on the representation
variable is similar in these estimations to that in column 2.
Finally, it is useful to visualize the striking cross-section relationship between representa-
tion and grants within federations. Averaging over the 1990s, Figure 3 plots each province’s
grants per capita as a share of the national average against the two-chamber average (for all
federations except Spain and Canada, which are only for the lower chamber) of its legisla-
tive seats per capita (also expressed as a share of the national average). The relationship
is substantively large and significant in every country but Spain. As discussed above, with
strong parties, proportional representation, and a weak upper chamber, Spain is the country
in the sample with the weakest institutions of regional representation.
−Figure 3 about here−
5 An Extension: When are Intergovernmental Grants
Progressive?
This section discusses a possible extension of our model to a broader question about inter-
regional redistribution. Progressive redistribution from rich to poor regions is a key goal of
many inter-governmental transfer systems, including those of Australia, Canada, Germany,
and Spain. Yet this is apparently not universal. In the empirical analysis above, the income
variable had a positive sign and never approached statistical significance. While malap-
portionment plays a large role in almost all federations, the correlation between provincial
income and intergovernmental grants varies dramatically from one federation to another, as
demonstrated in Figure 4.
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−Figure 4 about here−
Figure 4 plots each province’s intergovernmental grant receipts against its GDP per
capita, each expressed as a share of the national average. The size of the bubbles in Figure 4
correspond to the province’s relative legislative representation (the key independent variable
in the empirical analysis above). Intergovernmental grants are clearly progressive in Canada
and Germany. In Australia, they have been consistently progressive during the postwar
period, though by the 1990s, the Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory had
emerged as wealthy outliers. In Spain as well, the system is progressive on the whole, but
there are two wealthy outliers: Catalonia and the Basque Country. The correlation in Brazil
is consistently negative, and borders on statistical significance, especially when the Federal
District is dropped from the analysis. There is no significant relationship between grants
and income in Switzerland and the United States, while grants in Mexico and Argentina are
actually significantly regressive every year.
Figure 4 hints at a possible reason for the cross-country differences that harkens back
to Figure 2 above. The federations that systematically over-represent poor states appear
to be those with the most consistently progressive transfer systems, while those that sys-
tematically over-represent wealthy states have the most regressive transfer systems. Figure
4 demonstrates that in Canada, the poor states are relatively over-represented (relatively
large bubbles) and receive transfers that are well above the national average. This is also
the case in Germany if one ignores the relatively wealthy, over-represented city-states. In
Argentina and Mexico, the positive correlation between income and grants is clearly driven
by the over-represented states.
Thus it seems plausible that the regional representation scheme might have some impact
on the bargaining power of poor provinces. While the formal model above does not allow for
a clean comparative static on this point, it does help generate some insight into the impact
of representation on the progressivity of transfers. Recall the simple example based on five
states, s = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 with income Y1 = 2, Y2 = 3, Y3 = 4, Y4 = 5, Y5 = 6. Consider a case
where each province has equal population size and an equal number of votes (3). In order
to pass, a proposal requires 8 votes. No matter which state is chosen as the agenda-setter,
it will set the tax rate at t = 1, and form a coalition with the poorest states in order to keep
as much of the surplus for itself as possible. States 4 and 5 are only members of coalitions
when they are designated as agenda-setters, and the probability of being so designated is 1
5
for each state. For example, state 5 would collect 20 in taxes and secure the votes of states
1 and 2 by giving them payoffs of 2 and 3 respectively, keeping 15 for itself State 1 would
make payoffs to states 2 and 3, keeping 13 for itself. Aggregating over each agenda-setting
scenario, the payoffs for states are summarized with the dark circles in Figure 5.
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−Figure 5 about here−
The payoffs are progressive. In the long run, transfers flow from states with above-
average income to states with below-average income. The relationship between income and
fiscal flows is not linear, however, since the votes of higher-income states among the poor
are more costly than the votes of the poorest states.
Next consider what happens if the votes are redistributed such that the two wealthiest
states are each given four votes, while the two poorest states are left with two and the
middle income state retains three votes. Building on the logic established above, this has
two impacts on the expected payoff. First, the two wealthiest states are more likely to
be chosen as agenda-setters. Second, state 4 is now an attractive coalition partner when
relatively poor states are chosen as the agenda-setter because its four crucial votes can be
purchased with a payout of only 5. In other words, low income is no longer the primary
driver of a state’s attractiveness as a coalition partner. Low income must now compete with
size.
Finally, consider the impact of increasing the representation of the two poorest states
in a similar fashion. The impact owing to their attractiveness as coalition partners has
not changed, but their payoff is dramatically improved (see Figure 5) not only because
they are more likely to be chosen as agenda-setters, but also because when designated as
agenda-setters, they can form a majority by relying only on one another, shutting out the
high-income states altogether, which leads to a more progressive outcome than in the case
of equal apportionment.
It is not possible to make a general theoretical claim about the impact of apportionment
on the progressivity of intergovernmental transfers, because the average expected payoff is
highly contingent on exactly which states are over-represented and how dramatically, along
with the precise distributions of income, population, and voting weights across provinces.
However, it is useful to examine the model’s predictions under a range of possible scenar-
ios. In fact, our data set provides a very useful set of real-world distributions of population
and income across jurisdictions. For each country, we can examine the model’s predictions
under the hypothetical situation where given the federation’s distribution of income across
provinces, the voting weights are exactly proportionate to each province’s population, and
we can contrast this with the model’s prediction under the actual voting weights of each
province in the legislature.
More specifically, Figure 6 displays the results of two exercises. First, we examine the
hypothetical of equal apportionment by imagining that the seats for each state are exactly
proportionate to its population, calculating the payoffs that would be associated with the
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minimum winning coalition that would be formed when each state is the agenda setter, and
taking the weighted average of these payoffs, weighting by population.
In the second exercise, rather than imagining that the seats are proportionate to popu-
lation, we calculate one set of average payoffs based on the weights of the seats in the lower
chamber, and another based on the weights of the seats in the upper chamber, and take the
average of the two payoffs. (figures for Canada and Spain are based on the lower chamber
only).
−Figure 6 about here−
Figure 6 presents smoothed lowess plots of these two ”predicted” payoffs against each
province’s per capita income, and for comparison, we also present a lowess plot of actual
grants against income (all expressed as shares of the national average). The ”equal appor-
tionment” payoffs are in orange, the payoffs based on actual representation are in green, and
the observed grants are in blue.
First, consider the orange lines. The slightly progressive ”equal representation” payoff
from the simple example in Figure 5 holds for a variety of real-world income distributions.
The model predicts a slightly higher payoff for the wealthiest of the states below the median,
but then substantially lower, uniform payoffs for the states above the median (Note that the
lowess plots for income shares above 1.5 are generally based on very few observations). This
is because the poor states are more attractive coalition partners.
Note, however, that this relationship is not universal. In Canada, the hypothetical equal
representation payoffs are actually regressive. Given the small number of states, the con-
centration of population in Ontario and Quebec, and very small size of the poor provinces,
it is not possible to exclude rich states from winning coalitions, and wealthy provinces are
very frequently chosen as agenda setters. In all of the other federations, there is a statisti-
cally significant negative correlation between income and the predicted payoff because of the
attractiveness of poor states as coalition partners.
But in some federations, this changes rather dramatically when we look at the model’s
predictions based on the asymmetric voting weights observed in actual legislatures. The
model prediction becomes regressive in Argentina and Mexico, and flat, bordering on regres-
sive for the United States (the steep upward slope on the high end is driven primarily by
Wyoming and Alaska) because of the over-representation of wealthy states. In other feder-
ations, most notably Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Germany, the predicted payoffs based
on the observed voting weights are more progressive than the equal apportionment baseline,
due to the joint impact of improved proposal power and increased attractiveness as coalition
partners for some of the poor states.
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Canada is especially interesting in this regard. Figure 6 suggests that even though malap-
portionment is not particularly large in the Canadian parliament relative to upper chambers
of other federations, it may nevertheless be an important part of the story of the emergence
of a progressive transfer system in Canada in the 20th century due to the high correlation
between poverty and over-representation.
Finally, the fact that the green and blue lowess plots are right on top of one another in
most federations suggests that the when the actual legislative voting weights are considered,
the theoretical model is a very good predictor of long-term inter-territorial redistribution.
Without knowing anything about the power of left-wing parties, preferences of voters, or
norms of inter-regional solidarity, it may be possible to understand why grants are progressive
in some federations and regressive in others with knowledge only of the provincial bargaining
weights and the inter-provincial income distribution.
6 Conclusion
Asymmetric representation of states and provinces is a key feature of some of the world’s
most populous democracies. This paper has shown that these representation structures have
a substantial impact on the distribution of resources within federations.
First, we have shown that in a simple legislative bargaining model with endogenous
taxation, the advantages of over-represented regions are unambiguous. Not only do they
benefit from their greater likelihood of being chosen as agenda-setters, but they are also
more attractive coalition partners when other states are chosen as agenda setters.
Second, we have mobilized a unique provincial-level data set from a large group of feder-
ations over a period of several decades to examine the impact of representation on patterns
of inter-provincial redistribution. Federations are especially useful for this type of analy-
sis because by all accounts, bargaining over the erection of national taxes with asymmetric
regional payoffs has been a central concern over the last 50 years in modern federations.
Elected regional representatives in democratic federations face strong incentives to direct
federal expenditures to their home provinces, and they have few incentives to vote in favor
of proposals that would redistribute income away from their constituents.
In existing single-country empirical studies, it is often difficult to differentiate between
the possible impact of over-representation in the legislature and other highly correlated
characteristics of states such as low population, low population density, low income, or
location in the economic periphery. Moreover, little has been known about the extent to
which the relationship between representation and budgetary outlays might extend to various
institutional contexts. Our multi-country study includes federations with a wide variety of
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background conditions, income distributions, and institutions.
We have shown that the relationship between representation and intergovernmental
grants is robust in a surprisingly wide variety of settings. However, we found that the
relationship does not hold up in Spain: the one country in our sample with the weakest
institutions of territorial representation and the most tenuous connection to the concept of
”federalism.” This raises the possibility that a future study with regional-level data on rep-
resentation and fiscal flows in a sample of unitary systems with strong party systems and
weak institutions of territorial representation would find rather different results. This is an
attractive avenue for further research.
Finally, we have introduced a possibility that is worthy of further theoretical and empirical
analysis. To the extent that malapportionment systematically favors rich or poor states, it
can have an impact on the overall progressivity of intergovernmental transfers.
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Table 3: Multilevel Estimation for Intrastate Legislative Bargaining
Dependent Variable: Grants Share/Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Seat Share/Capita 0.78 0.74 0.33 0.35
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Lag Grants Share/Capita - - 0.53 0.54
- - (0.01) (0.01)
Population Share - -0.06 -0.005 -0.002
- (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Income Share - 0.09 -0.001 0.001
- (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Log(Relative State Size) - 0.1 0.04 0.06
- (0.03) (0.01) (0.03)
Capital State - 0.63 0.31 0.35
- (0.21) (0.10) (0.14)
+ country fixed effects
+ years fixed effects
Constant 0.23 0.55 0.25 -0.03
(0.12) (0.16) (0.20) (0.30)
Log-likelilhood -227 -100 394 -950
N 3667 3465 3264 3264
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Table 4: Multilevel Estimation for Intrastate Legislative Bargaining
Dependent Variable: Grants Share/Capita
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Seat Share/Capita 0.33 0.74 0.33 0.35 0.29
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
Lag Grants Share/Capita 0.53 - 0.54 0.55 0.54
(0.01) - (0.01) (0.01) 0.01)
Population Share -0.005 -0.06 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Income Share -0.001 0.09 -0.0004 0.001 -0.001
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Log(Relative State Size) 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.027) (0.01)
Capital State 0.31 0.61 0.30 0.33 0.30
(0.10) (0.21) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10)
Presidential System - -0.01 -0.01 -0.004 -0.05
- (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10)
Number of States - 0.003 0.001 0.02 0.001
- (0.005) (0.002) (0.05) (0.002)
Log(Democracy Age) - -0.06 -0.02 0.005 -0.01
- (1.12) (0.51) (0.03) (0.5)
Presidential System*Seat Share/Capita - - - - 0.05
- - - - (0.08)
+ years fixed effects
Constant 0.25 0.97 0.37 -0.01 0.39
(0.12) (8.51) (3.88) (0.30) (3.90)
Log-likelilhood 394 -96 402 -945 401
N 3264 3264 3264 3264 3264
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Table 5: Estimation for Cross-Sectional Intrastate Legislative Bargaining
Dependent Variable: Grants Share/Capita
(1) (2) (3)
Seat Share/Capita 0.60 0.60 0.61
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Population Share 0.02 0.03 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Income Share -0.004 -0.003 -0.009
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Log(Relative State Size) 0.05 0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Capital State 0.35 0.33 0.34
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19)
Presidential System - -0.11 -0.58
- (0.18) (0.22)
Number of States - - 0.02
- - (0.01)
Log(Democracy Age) - 0.77 4.02
- (2.40) (2.08)
Constant 0.25 -5.40 -30.22
(0.14) (18.16) (15.78)
N 209 209 209
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Figure 3: Legislative Representation and Grants, 1990s
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Figure 4: Income and Grants, 1990s
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Figure 5: Income and Average Payoffs in 3 Simple Examples
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